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THE LEGAL PHOENIX: TE PLAiN MEANING RULE
IS DEAD, LONG LIVE THE RULE!
JAMES FAGAN*

One of the earliest approaches to statutory interpretation was the Plain
Meaning Rule.' Simply stated, the Plain Meaning Rule is that a court should
stop at interpreting an unambiguous statute with its plain meaning.2
Although it had its days of unquestioned authority, most attorneys who are
called upon to litigate a statute's meaning reject boring the court with
arguments based on the Plain Meaning Rule.3
Rather to everyone's

* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. LL.M. 1986, Columbia
University; J.D. 1984, St. John's University School of Law; M.A. 1991, Seminary of the
Immaculate Conception; M.P.A. 1981, Long Island University; B.A. 1980, Long Island
University.
1. More modem nomenclature is calling the Plain Meaning Rule part of textualism, which
seems to parallel constitutional interpretation methodology. Cf. Hans W. Baade, Original
Intent' in HistoricalPerspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1062 (1991).
It is also called literalism, due to the focus on the text.
I use Plain Meaning Rule due to my prejudice as a Legal Method Professor, having utilized
the classic textbook in the field. HARRY JONES, ElT AL., LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT
MATERIALS 388-466 (1980) (classic textbook for Legal Method) [hereinafter CASEBOOK]; see
John Kemochan, Statutory Interpretation:An Outline ofMethod, 3 DAI.OUsIE L.J. 333, 338-45
(1976).
2. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). There is recent indication that a
treaty will be interpreted according to its plain meaning, too. Cf. United States v. AlvarezMachan, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
3. Justice Scalia, in fact, has indicated that attorneys should not bore him with legislative
history. "It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such arguments (legislative-history and policy) have to be addressed ... with respect to a statute utterly devoid of language
that could remotely be thought (to be interpreted beyond its plain meaning)." Union Bank v.
Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Patterson v. Shumate, 112
S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (When the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" is considered in isolation, the phenomenon that three Courts of Appeals could have thought
it a synonym for "state law" is mystifying. When the phrase is considered together with the rest
of the Bankruptcy Code (in which Congress chose to refer to state law as, logically enough,
"state law"), the phenomenon calls into question whether our legal culture has so far departed
from attention to text, or is so lacking in agreed-upon methodology for creating and interpreting
text, that it any longer makes sense to talk of "a government of laws, not of men.") United
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("By perpetuating
the view that legislative history can alter the meaning of even a clear statutory provision, we
produce a legal culture" in which statements from floor debates are taken for evidence of a
particular result.).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 2, Art. 2
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

surprise the rule is not dead and, in fact, may be very well indeed, thank
you. This article will explore the rise, fall and renewal of the Plain Meaning
Rule, both within the federal system and within state judicial systems. In
section one of the article, the rise and fall of the Plain Meaning rule will be
explored. In the second section, the current rise of the rule in the United
States Supreme Court will be reviewed. In the third section, this article will
discuss the Plain Meaning Rule within state courts. Finally, the concluding
section of this article will show that the Plain Meaning Rule continues to
exist in both the federal and state judicial systems. Therefore, attorneys must
be sensitive to the significance of the Plain Meaning rule, lest they do both
their client and the court a disservice.4
A HISTORY LESSON IN PLAIN MEANING
The history of the Plain Meaning Rule can be traced to the English

courts. In 1603, the court of common pleas held that because the words of
a statute express the intent of the makers of the Acte judges should interpret
a statute in harmony with the Plain Meaning. However, this decision must
be read against the precedent of the Heydon's Case6 decided in 1584. In
Heydon's Case, the court held that a fundamental rule of statutory construc-

tion is to determine the purpose of the statute and interpret the statute to
facilitate the purpose.7 Therefore, although English jurisprudence indicates
that a court should enforce the unambiguous words of the Parliamentary
Act,' the English judicial system did not, in fact, adhere to a pure Plain
Meaning Rule for statutory interpretation. 9
In the American judicial system, the genesis of the Plain Meaning Rule
can be discerned in early Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court, in

4. It has been suggested that the Plain Meaning Rule has an adverse affect on legal fees by
not requiring as many bankable hours. Attorneys will not be required to pour over volumes of
legislative history, but only the text of the statute. Anthony D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy,
85 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 175 n.88 (1990). I would just add, that if the statute is clear, it is
better for society to have any conflict settled at a very early stage. Furthermore, it is the
legislature that creates the volumes of legislative history. Even if the Plain Meaning Rule is
rejected, legislatures, especially Congress, should attempt to limit legislative history. There has
been a recent example during the Civil Rights Act of 1991. There was unanimous consent to
an interpretive Memorandum included in the record which stated it was the "exclusive legislative
history." S. 1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong. Ree. 15275 (1991).
5. Edrich's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 238, 239 (1603). The court notes that the words will be
given the express meaning because nothing can so express the meaning of the makers of the Act,
as their own direct words.
6. 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584).
7. To interpret a statute, four things are to be discerned and considered: (a) what was the
common law before the making of the Act; (b) what was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide; (c) what remedy the Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth; and (d) the true reason of the remedy. Then interpret the
statute to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Id. at 638.
8. The Mary, 165 Eng. Rep. 1235, 1237 (1811).
9. R. v. Wensley, 101 Eng. Rep. 88, 89 (1793).
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an opinion by Justice Story, clearly held that the plain meaning was a method
of statutory interpretation because "[t]he legislature must be presumed to use
words in their known and ordinary signification ...."10 The rule continued
to be applied"1 and continued to be widely accepted at the turn of this
century.12 Yet, for most attorneys, the clearest statement of the rule
appeared in Caminetti v. United States. 3 Therein, Justice Day stated the
Plain Meaning Rule as follows: "[w]here the language is plain and admits of
no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the

10. Levy v. M'Cartee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 102, 110 (1832). Chief Justice Marshall adopted a
plain meaning approach to interpreting contracts. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat)
120 (1819). The authors of the casebook use this as an early example of the plain meaning rule.
CASEBOOK, supra note 1, at 389. Although it is some evidence of Marshall's position in
interpreting statutes, I cannot embrace it as binding authority. However, in the case of United
States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820), Marshall clearly stated the Plain Meaning
Rule, of statutory interpretation. "The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the
words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing
from the plain meaning of words . . .in search of an intention which the words themselves did
not suggest." Id. at 95-96.
11. Maillard v. Lawrence, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 250, 261 (1853) ("The popular or received
import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of public laws.").
12. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899). It was not the exclusive
method of statutory interpretation. In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, the Supreme
Court was asked to interpret a statute which prohibited contracting "to prepay the transportation,
or in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration, of any alien ... to perform
labor or service of any kind in the United States...." Church of The Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892). Defendant, a religious society, had contracted with an alien
residing in England to be its pastor. Clearly, the plain meaning rule would have required the
Court to hold that defendant had violated the statute. However, the Supreme Court found
evidence that the purpose of the law was to prohibit manual labor from coming into the country.
Therefore, "the reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter." "It is a familiar
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because
not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Id. at 459. The Court went on to
indicate that giving the language a broad purpose would be against religion, which cannot be
imputed to Congress. The Court reviewed the history of religion in the country to establish that
Congress could never intend an interpretation which would infringe on religion, Id. at 465-72.
Although Holy Trinity has been cited as authority against the Plain Meaning Rule, the religious
aspect should not be minimized as a moving factor.
The Holy Trinity Court cites United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1869) as
authority for rejecting the plain meaning of a statute. In Kirby, the defendant was indicted for
knowingly and willfully obstructing the passage of the mail of the United States, in violation of
federal law. Kirby, a sheriff of Gallatin County, admitted that he had boarded the steamboat
carrying the mail of the United States to arrest an alleged murderer, pursuant to grand jury
indictments. The Court held that Kirby's actions did not constitute "knowingly and willfully
obstructing the mail of the U.S." within the meaning of the federal law. In other words, the
Court found that his actions were not the type Congress intended to prohibit by enacting the law.
Although the court considered congressional intent when they construed the statute, the basis of
its interpretation was not a rejection of the Plain Meaning Rule. In my opinion, the Court, used
the Golden Rule. See infra notes 15. "General terms should be so limited in their application
as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence." Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
Clearly, it would be absurd to hold a law enforcement agent guilty of a crime committed by
another.
13. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
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rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." 4 There
exists an escape route, called the Golden Rule."5 Under the Golden Rule,
if the plain meaning of the statute leads to absurd results, the court will not
interpret the statute using the plain meaning. 6 Because the exception is
rarely employed, I like to call it the "all humankind jump up" exception.
This nomenclature derives from a statement made by Chief Justice Marshall,
who stated that the absurdity must "be so monstrous that all mankind would,
without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application."17
Having proclaimed the Plain Meaning Rule, the Supreme Court
attempted to practice what it ruled."5 The Court failed. Initially, there

14. Id. at 485. One problem in Caminetti is the majority's position on Holy Trinity. As
noted, in Holy Trinity, the Court stated, "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because it is not within the its spirit, nor
within the intention of its makers." Id. at 459 (emphasis added). Yet the majority in Caminetti
fails to address the "self-contradictory" rule, looking at the plain meaning and the intent, too.
Baade, supra note 1, at 1087. Another aspect of Caminetti is that the language in question, "for
any other purposes," had been used in:another act by Congress, the Immigration Act of 1907,
and was subsequently construed by the Supreme Court. United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393
398 (1908). In 1908, the Supreme Court had held that Congress, in using this phrase, "had
reference to the views commonly entertained among the people of the United States as to what
is moral or immoral in the relations between man and woman in the matter of such intercourse.
those views may not be overlooked in determining questions involving the morality or
immorality of sexual intercourse between particular persons." Id. at 402. Since the Mann Act
involved in Caminetti was enacted in 1910, it appears that Congress intended the phrase to have
the same meaning reaching more than just commercial activities. ALEXANDER BIcKEL & BENNO
SCHMIDT, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, vol IX 426 (1984). Therefore, the Court held
that to be a concubine was immoral. Furthermore, because the phrase had in fact previously been
construed, stare decisis required the results that were reached in Caminetti. James F. Fagan, Jr.,
Say It Ain't So, Lewis-The Agony of a New Legal Method Professor, 4 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
149, 153-55 (1992).
15. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (interpreting a statute not to allow the
defense of entrapment is "so shocking to the sense of justice" that court refuses to apply the
statute's plain meaning). CASEBOOK, supra note 1, at 388-89. Of course, another avenue around
the Plain Meaning Rule, by its nature, is to hold that the statute is ambiguous. In fact, the
dissent in Caminetti takes the position that the statute is ambiguous. 242 U.S. at 496-97 (McKenna, J., dissenting). Justice McKenna's position in interpreting statutes looks at the statute's
context and the purpose of the statute. Id. at 497.
16. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 490.
17. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 120, 202 (1819). A more recent example
is Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924), where the Court held that a native-born citizen
of the United States could not utilize a statute intended for naturalized citizens of the United
States.
18. Even in the year of Caminetti, the Supreme Court did use reports of committees and
statements made by the committee chair-person to determine Congressional intent, but "not for
the purpose of construing it contrary to its plain terms, but in order to remove any ambiguity. . ." United States v. St. Paul, M & M R. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918); see also United
States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 217 (1920) ("Nothing is better settled than that
in the construction of a law its meaning must first be sought in the language employed");
Railroad Com. of Wis. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922) (extrinsic aids
"are only admissible to solve doubt and not to create it."). But cf. Ozawa v. United States, 260
U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (If the plain meaning leads to an "unreasonable result plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole" the court should 'look to the reason of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and give its effect in accordance with its design and
purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the Eternal meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.
See ... Holy Trinity.)
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were cases which did not strictly apply the Plain Meaning Rule.19 Then,
less than a dozen years later, there was an even greater retreat from strict
adherence, where some argue Justice Holmes "deruled the rule."' In
Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States he announced that the Plain
Meaning rule "is an axiom of experience rather than a rule of law, and does
not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."21 Holmes
overrode the plain meaning of the statute where Congress used "a certain
phrase with a more limited meaning."' I am not persuaded that a Holmesian approach to statutory construction is a rejection of the Plain Meaning
rule. One reason is that prior to Boston Sand & Gravel, Holmes clearly
admitted that he followed the rule. 3 Another reason is that the case quoted
19. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465 (1920). In Simpson, the Supreme
Court was required to interpret the Reed Amendment which declared that "whoever
shall... cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in the interstate commerce, except for
scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, into any State, the laws of
which... prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes
shall be punished." Id. at 466. Defendant had transported five quarts of whiskey in his car for
his personal use. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the defendant had violated the
Reed Amendment. "The evil against which the statute was directed was the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into a prohibition State from another State. . ." Id. at 466. The dissent
indicated that the term "interstate commerce" had a plain meaning, since early days the term
meant commercial, business, intercourse carried on between the inhabitants of two or more of
the United States. Id. at 468 (Clark, J. dissenting). See also Sharrenberg v. Dollar S.S. Co.,
245 U.S. 122 (1917) (court uses the purpose of the act to interpret it, citing Holy Trinity).
Justice Brandeis never accepted the rule, rejecting it in the same year as Caminetti. New York
Cent. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 154 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis does
state that to ascertain the intent of Congress we must look, of course, first at what Congress has
said, then at the action it has taken "[flor Congress must be presumed to have intended the
necessary consequences of its action." Id. at 158. However, in determining whether the
Employers' Liability Act preempts state regulation, Brandeis quickly leaves the plain words of
the statute and jumps into legislative history. His analysis of the words of the statute, which he
states is in his favor, is a mere paragraph, while his review of the origin, scope, purpose nature,
methods and means of the law extends over ten pages. Id. at 158-71. Justice Brandeis led a
direct challenge to the plain meaning rule later in his career, see notes 27-30, infra, but clearly
he held that position from the beginning of his career. It should be noted that Justice Brandeis
had knowledge of the legislative process obtained from his public interest fights in Massachusetts. PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 335 (1984). Thus, he
would understand that statutes are the results of a political process and not exact rules. "The
strict letter of an act must, however, yield to its evident spirit and purpose, when this is
necessary to give effect to the intent of Congress." Fleischmann Constr. Co. v. United States,
270 U.S. 349, 360 (1926) (citing Holy Trinity); cf. United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354 (1926).
20. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper. The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 280
(1990).
21. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
22. Id. at 48.
23. Justice Holmes joined the majority in Carninetti. In Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons,
Ltd., 259 U.S. 80 (1922), Holmes used a plain meaning analysis and was chided by Justice
McKenna, in his dissent, for not following Holy Trinity, in that a statute should not be taken at
its word against its spirit, and intention. Id. at 93 (McKenna, J., dissenting). Justice McKenna
went on to note that the Court had followed Holy Trinity, which sanctioned rejecting plain
meaning as a "destructive revolution" argument. Id. For an earlier Justice Holmes opinion
employing the Plain Meaning Rule, see United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911). In an
even earlier article, Justice Holmes stated that in jurisprudence, "[w]e do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of
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involved a limited public law passed specifically to waive sovereign
immunity so that the owner of the steam lighter Cornelia could sue the
United States for damage rising out of a collision between it and the United
States destroyer.' When Congress passed a general law as a substitute for
using special public bills similar to the one in the above mentioned case, it
clearly established its position on the issue involved in the case based upon
prior practice.' Furthermore, even though not applicable to the case at
bar, Justice Holmes, was influenced by a later general law, and interpreted
the public law in harmony with it.' Finally, Justice Holmes, in the same
term, joined a unanimous court that stated "[a]dherence to [the statute's]
terms leads to nothing impossible or plainly unreasonable. We are therefore
bound by the words employed and are not at liberty to conjure up conditions
to raise doubts in order that resort may be had to construction."27 Consequently, a Holmesian jurisprudence of the Plain Meaning Rule exists.
The 1930's started the demise of the Plain Meaning Rule. Initially
several scholars detected problems with the rule.' Although most lower
federal courts continued to follow the Plain Meaning Rule,29 there were

Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
As Justice Frankfurter noted years later, "One gets the impression that in interpreting
statutes Mr. Justice Holmes reached meaning easily, as was true of most of his results, with
emphasis on the language in the totality of the enactment and the felt reasonableness of the
chosen construction." Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 532 (1947).

24. Special Act of May 15, 1922, c. 192, 42 Stat., Part 2, 1590. See Boston Sand &
Gravel, 242 U.S. at 46.
25. The issue was whether the United States was liable for interest on damages done by
public vessels. The public act did not specially exclude interest, although it had been the policy
of the United States for years before 1922 not to allow interest. Boston Sand & Gravel, 278
U.S. at 47. However, four members of the court dissented based upon the plain meaning of the
statute, finding that the plain language of the law did not exclude interest. Id. at 49 (Sutherland,
J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 4849. Justice Holmes noted that the United States is not liable for interest in any
general case, a presumption of law that also influenced his position. The absence of language
would not overcome the presumption. Id. at 47.
27. United States v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 277 (1929). The Court went on
to state: "Construction may not be substituted for legislation." Id. at 278.
Justice Frankfurter quoted a letter written by Justice Holmes' which strongly evidenced his
position. "Only a day or two ago-when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was
indiscreet enough to say I don't care what their intention was. I only want to know what the
words mean." Frankfurter, supra note 23, at 538. In my opinion this statement is similar to the
one recently made by J. Scalia, "It is regrettable that we have a legal culture in which such
arguments (legislative intention) have to be addressed ... with respect to a statute utterly devoid
of language (that is ambiguous)." Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
28. James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930);
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930). But see Frederick J.
de Sloovere, Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 407
(1932).
29. See, e.g., Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1940);
McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 697 (1937). In
Echols v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1932), the Court noted that Holy Trinity was
limited to a case where a court was refusing to enforce a statute not intended to be enacted by

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss2/2

6

Fagan: The Legal Phoenix: The Plain Meaning Rule is Dead, Long Live the

1993]

THE LEGAL PHOENIX

379

small movements away from it.3° In the state courts, there was clear
division. Some courts rejected the Plain Meaning Rule, using legislative
history and purpose as a basis to interpret a statute.31 Other state courts
continued to interpret state statutes using a plain meaning approach. 2 In the
Supreme Court, clear rejection of the plain meaning rule could be found in

a dissent by Justice Brandeis, who analyzed a law by its language, but stated
that his statutory analysis "is confirmed by reference to legislative history of

the Act." 33 Justice Brandeis was honest by citing Caminetti during his
analysis, but with the signal "compare."'

Thereafter, a case arose where

the majority rejected legislative history, but Justice Brandeis garnered two
other justices to concur "on the ground[s] that the statute. . . reads as its
legislative history shows Congress intended it to read. . .. "I One could
argue that the Plain Meaning Rule was resuscitated when an unanimous

Supreme Court stated: "We have refused to nullify statutes, however hard or
unexpected the particular effect, where unambiguous language called for a
logical and sensible result."' However, it was a short lived last hurrah,
because the fatal blow would come two years later in 1940, in the case of
United States v. American Trucking Assn's.'3 Therein the Supreme Court

clearly killed the Plain Meaning Rule. "When aid to construction of the
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be

the legislature. This construction seems to be indicating that Holy Trinity was only establishing
the Golden Rule. See supra note 15. The illustrative cases cited in the opinion demonstrate that,
to justify a departure from the letter of the law upon that ground, the absurdity must be so gross
as to shock the general moral or common sense. Compare Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
182 U.S. 438, 451-52 (1901). Furthermore, there must be something to make plain the intent
of Congress that the letter of the statute is not to prevail. Treat v. White, 181 U.S. 264, 268
(1901); see Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60 (1930); Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932).
30. Grier v. Kennan, 64 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1933). Some courts tried to use both legislative
history, citing Holy Trinity, and plain meaning, citing Caminetti. See Reichelderfer v. Johnson,
63 App. D.C. 334, 72 F.2d 552 (1934).
31. Collins v. Superior Ct., 62 P.2d 131 (Ariz. 1936); Realty Bond & Share Co. v. Englar,
143 So. 152 (Fla. 1932); Moran v. Bowley, 179 N.E. 526 (In. 1932); Brustein v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 174 N.E. 304 (N.Y. 1931); Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American
Fed'n of Silk Workers, 172 A. 551 (N.J. 1934); Watkins v. Hall, 172 S.E. 445 (Va. 1933).
32. Higgins' Case, 187 N.E. 592 (Mass. 1933); City of Spokane v. State, 89 P.2d 826
(Wash. 1939).
33. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 72 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter noted later that he believed that Justice Brandeis "would draw on the whole arsenal
of aids to construction" for statutory interpretation cases. Frankfurter, supra note 23, at 532.
34. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 72 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). I think it should have been
a negative signal. Justice John Clarke, who served six years with Justice Brandeis, on the
Supreme Court indicated that Justice Brandeis overloaded opinions with citations "which often
we require foreign to the subject in hand and as if conscious of this he introduced them often
by the word 'compare'" Letter from John Clarke to Newton Baker (June 22, 1934) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve University Archives).
35. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., Stone J. & Cardozo J., concurring in results).
36. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 333 (1938).
37. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
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no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear
on 'superficial examination.'" 3" Thereafter, for another twenty-five years,

the rule lay dead. 39 In 1975, one scholar indicated that with one exception,

"inno case since American Trucking has the Supreme Court actually refused
to look at legislative history."'
Without the constraints of the Plain Meaning Rule, courts had a "full
range of legislative history materials" at their disposal for use in construing
a statute.41 In attempting to interpret a statute according to the intent of the
legislature, the courts used both intrinsic and extrinsic tools. Intrinsic tools
include the act as a whole,42 the Act's title43 and preambles." Extrinsic
evidences of legislative intent can be found in committee reports, 45 statements made by witnesses during committee hearings," interpretation by the
sponsor of the bill,47 deletions of provisions from the bill during a conference committee,4" rejection of a limiting amendment 49 and the history of
the language as it evolved.' These were just some of the "full range" of
tools available to courts in interpreting statutes after rejection of the Plain
Meaning Rule.
THE RESURRECTION OF THE RULE

The Plain Meaning Rule is a Legal Phoenix."' Within fifty years after
its alleged demise in American Trucking, it is clear that it is rising again. At
first, it was only noted in a footnote.52 Many were slow to acknowledge

38. Id. at 543-44.
39. Arthur Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1303 (1975). The
one possible exception noted by Professor Murphy was Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
330 U.S. 485 (1947)z. Id. at 1302-03.
40. Murphy, supra note 39, at 1302-03.
41. Kernochan, supra note 1,at 351.
42. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973).
43. F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959).
44. Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550, 563 (1892).
45. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 550 (1956).
46. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 576-77 (1971).
47. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404-07 (1973).
48. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974).
49. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 706 (1971).
50. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp, 536 F.2d 509, 512-13
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
51. In Egyptian mythology, the Phoenix was an eagle-like bird, which appeared only once
every five hundred years. NEW LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MYTHOLOGY 45 (1968 ed.). As
the legend goes, when the Phoenix felt it was going to die, it made a nest and set fire to itself,
whereas a new phoenix rose from the ashes. PIERRE GRIMAL, THE DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL
MYTHOLOGY 369 (1986).
52. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss2/2

8

Fagan: The Legal Phoenix: The Plain Meaning Rule is Dead, Long Live the

1993]

THE LEGAL PHOENIX

the rise. 3 This was to be expected, since there was only a shadow, a
specter if you will, of the Plain Meaning Rule.5 Now, within the last
several years, there is clearly a battle to resurrect the Plain Meaning Rule at
least in some form.55 Although some argue that several justices apply the
Plain Meaning Rule,' there are two clear proponents, Justice Kennedy and
Justice Scalia.57 I believe that for the most part both Justices apply the

Plain Meaning Rule in a similar manner.
possess a slightly different focus.

Hamiltonian basis. 5

However, each approach does

Justice Kennedy seems to have a

Justice Scalia, however, who has been called the

53. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983).
54. "We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
55. I believe that Justice Scalia already believes the war has been won. Chisom v. Roemer,
111 S.Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J.dissenting) ("I thought we had adopted a regular
method for interpreting the meaning of language in a statute...") (emphasis added).
56. Some note Justice White, who does seem to apply the rule. Patricia M. Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of
the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 298 (1990). But see Jerry L.
Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretationof Federal Statutes, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 827-33 (1991) (only Justices Scalia and Kennedy seem firmly attached to the
Plain Meaning Rule).
57. Although it is too early to categorize Justice Thomas, there are clear suggestions that he
adheres to the Plain Meaning Rule. See United States v. Salerno, 112 S.Ct. 2503 (1992); "We
have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
then, the first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete.' Rubin v. United States, 449
U.S. 424, 430 (1981)." Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (some
citations omitted). In fact, Justice Thomas has indicated that he will go to great lengths to find
a statute unambiguous using the United States Reports as a deposit of "innumerable rules of
construction powerful enough to make clear an otherwise ambiguous penal statute." United
States v. R.L.C., 112 S.Ct. 1329, 1341 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
58. Hamilton noted, "The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise will instead ofjudgment, the consequence would equally be the substitution
of their pleasure to that of the legislative body." THE FEDERAu1ST PAPERS 78, 493 (Benjamin
Fletcher-Wright ed. 1961). (emphasis omitted) Hamilton noted that due to the judiciary's
"comparative weakness," any judicial encroachment on the legislative authority will be
corrected. THE FEDERAUST PAPERS 82. Therefore, Hamilton understood as important the
separation of powers, which is prominent in Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence on the Plain
Meaning Rule. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467-68 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Yet, Justice Kennedy would consider the "practical realities" of the
business sphere to properly determine the sense of the law. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v.
William Wrigley Jr., Co., 112 S.Ct. 2447, 2461 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Hamilton,
from the commercial center, would clearly concur.
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"high priest"59 and "spiritual leader " ' ° of the Plain Meaning Rule, seems
to have a Holmesian approach. 61
Justice Kennedy indicates that courts must use the Plain Meaning Rule
based upon the doctrine of separation of powers.62 Departing from the plain
meaning of the statute would substitute the judges' predilections for the will
of the Congress.'
It is the courts' function, in the federal system, to
interpret laws passed by Congress and signed by the President." Therefore,
interpretations that go beyond the plain meaning of the statute intrude upon
the province of the legislature.'
To Justice Kennedy, using the Plain

59. Mashaw, supra note 56, at 835. Justice Scalia had stated that the "St. Jude of the
hagiology of statutory construction" is legislative history. United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms
Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2111 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. Wald, supra note 56, at 281.
61. Although Holmes used the Plain Meaning Rule, he seemed to look at the section of the
law in context, therefore using a "text and context" approach. Justice Kennedy seem less likely
to use context.
62. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). "It remains one of the most vital functions of this Court to police with care the
separation of the governing powers. That is so even when ...no immediate threat to liberty
is apparent."
63. Rejecting the Plain Meaning Rule leads to "woolly judicial construction that mars the
plain face of legislative enactments." Id. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. "The first (of two issues involving separation of powers) concerns the rules this Court
must follow in interpreting a statute passed by Congress and signed by the President." Id. at
468 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This protects the values of bicameralism and presentment.
Mashaw, supra note 39, at 84045. Justice Kennedy seems concerned for the executive branch's
position in the process, more than other aspects of the rule. Compare I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987), where Justice Stevens notes the constitutional allocation of
power among three branches, reserving the legislative power exclusively to Congress. This
neglects the presentment aspect of the legislation process.
65.
[I]t does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through
unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover
an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable
...The problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less the views of the world
whence they come than the views of those who seek their advice.
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at473 (Kennedy, J., concurring injudgment). Justice Kennedy believes
that Holy Trinity allowed "Judges to substitute their personal predilections for the will of the
Congress. . . ." Id. at 474. Even an administrative interpretation followed by congressional
reenactment does not trump the plain language of a statute. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling
Co., 112 S.Ct. 2589, 2596 (1992). Most times the courts do give deference to a reasonable
statutory interpretation by an administering agency. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Judge Wald notes that "legislative history is the
authoritative product of the institutional work of the Congress" so that rejecting it "comes
perilously close.., to impugning the way a coordinate branch conducts its operations and, in
that sense, runs the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of powers
principle." Wald, supra note 56, at 306-07. Judge Easterbrook would answer that such use of
legislative history "would demean the constitutionally prescribed method of legislating to suppose
that its elaborate apparatus for deliberation on, amending, and approving a text is just a way to
create some evidence about the law, while the real source of legal rules is the mental processes
of legislators." In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
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Meaning Rule requires the courts to interpret a statute according to "the basic

meaning of words in a normal manner. " 6

Justice Kennedy would allow for the Golden Rule exception to the Plain

Meaning Rule. In this narrow exception, "[w]here the plain language of the
statute would lead to 'patently absurd consequences' that 'Congress could not

possibly have intended,' we need not apply the language in such a fash-

ion."67 This position is in harmony with separation of powers because it

assumes that the coequal branch would not act in an absurd way.6
Although there are many similarities to the approach of Justice Kennedy,
the jurisprudence of Justice Scalia in utilizing the Plain Meaning Rule seems
to have a Holmesian focus. Justice Scalia holds that where a statute is
unambiguous, the interpretation should not be "expanded or contracted by the
statements of individual legislators or committees during the course of the
enactment process. " ' After finding the plain, unambiguous meaning of a
statute, Justice Scalia holds the court should, "using established canons of
construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible
meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If not-and especially if a good
reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain-we apply that ordinary
meaning."7
Furthermore, Justice Scalia is slow to find indication of
another meaning. 7' Of course, if the literal interpretation is absurd or
unconstitutional, it is "appropriate to consult all public materials ... and the

66. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 469 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy
has noted that the court should look at the design of the statute as a whole. K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). However, unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy does
not believe the context of the statute is talismatic.
67. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (citations and
emphasis omitted).
68. Id.
69. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 111 . Ct. 1138, 1147 (1991).
70. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted); see also United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1875 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(using the maxim noscitur a sociis, that words are understood by the surrounding words).
71. See, e.g., American Nat. Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992). In American
National Red Cross v. S. G., the Supreme Court was asked to interpret the charter of the
American National Red Cross, which provides, in pertinent part, that the organization is
authorized "to sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the,
jurisdiction of the United States," 36 U.S.C. § 2. The issue as whether the language confirmed
original jurisdiction on federal courts over all cases to which the Red Cross was a party. The
majority of the court determined that four earlier cases resulted in "the rule that a congressional
charter's 'sue and be sued' provision may be read to confer federal court jurisdiction if, but only
if, it specifically mentions the federal courts." American Nat. Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2471.
Justice Scalia disagreed stating that cases did not "establish the cryptology the Court attributes
to them." Id. at 2478. "This wonderland of linguistic confusion-in which words are sometimes
read to what they say and other times read also to mean what they do not say is based on the
erroneous premise that our cases in this area establish a 'magic words' jurisprudence that departs
from ordinary rules of English usage." Id. at 2476 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Justice Scalia,
the language of the charter only conferred capacity, not jurisdiction.
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legislative history" can be used.' But its use is limited to "verify that what
seems to [the Court] an unthinkable disposition. . . was indeed unthought
of, and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning of the word [in
the statute]."' Justice Scalia would not allow the legislative history to be
used to establish legislative intent. Instead, in a situation where the plain
meaning of the words of the statute would lead to an absurd result, the words

are given a meaning that is,
(1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely
to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words

of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision

must be integrated-a compatibility
which, by a benign fiction, we assume
74
Congress always has in mind.

Moreover, according to Scalia, Congressional silence can never be used as

a tool of statutory interpretation.75
utilized this analysis.76

Justice Holmes seems to have also

What are the reasons for Justice Scalia's rejection of tools of the
statutory interpretation trade in favor of a limited method, the Plain Meaning
Rule. Clearly Justice Scalia utilizes a political science approach to Congress.
He believes that Reports of the House of Representatives and the Senate do
not provide evidentiary elements for a court to find the intentions of the

72. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Judge Wald asks why legislative history is good in cases where Justice Scalia finds the plain
meaning absurd, and not reliable in other cases. Wald, supra note 56, at 296-97. I believe that
the Plain Meaning Rule is used first, as the best evidence of the intent of the legislature. When
it does not provide such function, another method is appropriate. Such a hierarchy restrains
judicial action, provided that the legislatures are on notice of the rules of construction. The Plain
Meaning Rule is "a political strategy for disciplining both judges and legislators." T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 32 (1988).
73. Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 528 (emphasis omitted).
75. "Statutes are the law though sleeping dogs lie." Chisom v. Roemer, I II S.Ct. 2354,
2370 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was answering the majority's determination that
Congressional silence can be used to interpret a statute because "(c)ongress' silence in this
regard 'Can be likened to the dog that did not bark. See A. Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The
Complete Sherlock Holmes 335 (1927)." Id. at 2364 n.23. Justice Thomas also holds that
congressional silence does not provide implicit ratification of a judicial decision interpreting a
statute. Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1903 n.8 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia is very concerned in using legislative history in criminal law, where it results in
a harsher interpretation of the statute against a criminal defendant than a common-sense interpretation. See United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 112 S.Ct. 2102, 2111 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (calling legislative history the "last hope of lost interpretive causes"). Justice
Thomas also agrees with this "rule of lessity" where a criminal statute should be interpreted
when two construction have different results, according to the harsher interpretation only when
the language of the statute is clear and definite. Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1900 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
76. Compare Justice Holmes position and language, supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text
with Justice Scalia's opinion in Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 121 (1990) ("The Court
acknowledges, as it must, the doctrine that when a statute employs a term with a specialized
legal meaning relevant to the matter at hand, that meaning governs.").
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Congress in enacting a law.' In fact, Justice Scalia seems to believe that
the method courts have been using to interpret statutes since American
Trucking has become corrupt.7 At one time it was possible that legislative
history did have meaning. 79 However, since people are now aware of the
tools courts use to interpret a statute, they can obtain the results desired, by
simply altering the legislative history.' Justice Scalia concurs with Justice
Kennedy in that the Plain Meaning Rule is in harmony with the doctrine of

77. In Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989), the majority used a reference in a lengthy
Senate Report to three district court opinions as bases for interpreting the "reasonable attorney's
fee" (The cases had considered awarding an attorney's fee under the Civil Rights laws prior to
the enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1976). Justice Scalia, in a
concurring opinion, mentions these cases, and in fact discusses a Circuit Court opinion that
construes the three district court opinion. Furthermore, Justice Scalia notes, that "anyone
familiar with modem-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the
references to the cases were inserted, as best by a committee staff member on his or her own
initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist."
Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that "only a small proportion of the
Members of Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in question, even if (as is not
always the case) the Reports happened to have been published before the vote.. ." Id.
As a Judge on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Scalia noted his political
science position.
I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, as opposed to the
broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report come to the attention of,
much less are approved by, the house which enacts the committee's bill. And I think
it time for courts to become concerned about the fact that routine deference to the
detail of committee reports, and the predictable expansion in that detail which routine
deference has produced, are converting a system ofjudicial construction into a system
of committee staff prescription.
Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com., 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
78. Justice Scalia notes that references in Congressional Reports are not used to inform the
Members of Congress but rather to influence judicial construction. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 9899 (Scalia, J., concurring). Judge Wald notes Justice Scalia's "mistrust ...of those staffers to
whom our elected legislators have delegated authority for certain parts of the [legislative]
process." Wald, supra note 56, at 284. Judge Wald holds that Justice Scalia provides no
documentation for his conclusion. However, it is clear that Justice Scalia could take judicial
notice of such legislative facts. See Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REv.
269, 270 (1944) A judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion of legislative facts).
Even if proof is required, there is evidence that legislative reports once written to inform
legislators about a statute and floor debates intended 'to provide a forum for deliberation are now
primarily constructed to influence future judicial decisions. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY,
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBULC POLICY 698-754 (1988).
79. But now reports are "increasingly unreliable evidence" of any Congressional Members
intention on the pending Act. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas agrees with Justice Scalia's rejection of use of extra-legal material for
interpreting statutes, noting committee reports and floor statements are not law. Unlike the
presumption that all citizens know the law, there is no presumption, or even inference, that any
citizen knows such extralegal material. United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1341-42
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
80. Lawyer-lobbyists understand the system, probably schooled in Legal Method, see
CASEBOOK, supra note 1.Thereafter, they will attempt to have evidence placed in the legislative
history which can be used as a basis for interpreting the statute contrary to the statute's Plain
Meaning, knowing that courts will "give legislative force to each snippet of analysis" found in
legislative history. Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 99.
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separation of power.81 However, Justice Scalia seems sensitive to the
context of the law, derived from either language used by Congress in other
laws," specialized legal meaning of language,3 or language used within
the same section of the same enactment." Furthermore, Justice Scalia
minimizes the executive role in the legislative process.0
Justice Scalia perceives the Plain Meaning Rule as a source of predictability.' Recently, Justice Scalia noted his "sympathy" for lower courts,
because departing from the Plain Meaning Rule undermines predictability.87
As a natural result, Justice Scalia believes more cases requiring judicial
intervention will arise since "innumerable statutory tests become worth
litigating."88 He views the fact that two parties disagree on the meaning of
a section as establishing "ambiguity," therefore rejecting the words of the
law in favor of legislative history.89
THE RULE IN STATE JURISPRUDENCE

The Plain Meaning Rule is clearly alive as seen in opinions of state
courts. A majority of the state courts clearly use the rule. Several indicate
some adherence. Others follow the rule based upon statutory mandates. At
least one state clearly rejects the Plain Meaning Rule, applying its own
method of statutory interpretation.

81. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
"Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language of those
laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent."; see also Wald,
supra note 56, at 282-83 ("Justice Scalia paints a thumbnail sketch explaining the justification
of the textual approach. Because the text of the statute is the only thing that the legislators
actually referred to when they voted, only the language itself was enacted into law").
82. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (1991). Wald, supra
note 56, at 284.
83. Moskal v. U.S., 498 U.S. 103, 119 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes, in
a case of a statute focused at Native Americans, stated "The word was addressed to the Indian
mind." Fleming v. MeCurtain, 215 U.S. 56, 60 (1909). Justice Frankfurter noted about Justice
Holmes, in statutory interpretation cases, "If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be
arbitrary not to assume that Congress intended its words to be read with the minds of ordinary
men. If they are addressed to specialists, they must be read by judges with the minds of the
specialists." Frankfurter, supra note 23, at 536.
84. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 781 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting.) InDewsnup, the
Supreme Court was asked to interpret the Bankruptcy Code. The majority, including Justice
Kennedy, held that the Bankruptcy Code must have been enacted against the background and
with a full understanding of the pre-Code practice. Therefore, the court will not interpret the
Bankruptcy Code to effect a major change in the pre-Code practice "that is not the subject of
at least some discussion in the [legislature]." Id. at 779. The majority held that the words of
the Bankruptcy Code at issue were ambiguous, however, it seems clear that the precode practice
created the ambiguity, not the words of the Bankruptcy Code.
85. Justice Scalia's focus is on legislative history, not the legislative process. Id. at 781.
86. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 787 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Predictability is always an important
aspect of the judicial system.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 788.
89. Id. at 781.
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As a preliminary note, most courts seek to interpret a statute according
to the intent of the legislature.' I categorized the states, where courts limit
review of legislative history and policy, and, instead, focus on the words of
the statute to interpret the statute in harmony with legislative intent, as
utilizing a plain meaning method. Many state opinions are a type of hybrid,
in that there is an attempt to use the plain meaning method of statutory
interpretation. However, state courts also review legislative history and
purpose to strengthen the court's interpretation of the statute as found by the
plain meaning method. Although I concede that one can reach another
conclusion, in my opinion these states are still Plain Meaning Rule states.
I limit the category to those states that reject the Plain Meaning Rule
decisions clearly using non-textual tools to interpret a statute, when the
statute's language provides an unambiguous interpretation.
As another caveat, I am sure that for most states a researcher could find
opinions seeming to interpret a state statute without following the Plain
Meaning Rule. I believe that such state courts are in a period similar to the
period between Caminetti and American Trucking, where there existed
decisions from the same court, where the court on one day follows the Plain
Meaning Rule and on another day does not use it. In part, this is the reason
for this piece; to attempt a movement in both state and federal systems to
either adopt or reject the Plain Meaning rule, so as to establish a fixed
method for statutory interpretation and give citizens predictability in
reviewing a legislative enactment.
With these ideas in mind, let us look at state court decisions to
understand the Plain Meaning Rule in state systems. Many states indicate that
an unambiguous statute must be interpreted according to its plain meaning. 91

90. Compare Caltabiano v. Planning & Zoning Comm., 560 A.2d 975, 977 (Conn. 1989)
(when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we assume that the words themselves
express the legislature's intent); Beau Brummell Ties, Inc. v. Lindley, 383 N.E.2d 907, 908
(Ohio 1978) (in determining legislative intent, it is the duty of the court to give effect to the
plain meaning of the language used in the statute) with Gilbane Co. v. Poulas, 576 A.2d 1195,
1196 (R.I. 1990) (the statute before us does not require a search for discernment of legislative
intent as we believe the language is unambiguous); State ex rel. Roach v. Dietrick, 404 S.E.2d
415, 417 (W. Va. 1991) (where the statute is not ambiguous, we need not ascertain the
legislative intent).
91. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. 1991); Graham v.
Forrest City Housing Auth., 803 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Ark. 1991); Danielson v. Castle Meadows,
Inc., 791 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Colo. 1990); Winchester Woods Assoc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm., 592 A.2d 953, 957 (Conn. 1991); Spielberg v. State, 558 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 1989); J.
Frog, Ltd. v. Fleming, 598 A.2d 735, 738 (D.C. App. 1991); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217,
219 (Fla. 1984); Ringewald v. Crawford W. Long Mem. Hosp., 368 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1988),
overruled on other grounds, Spivey v. Ehiddon, 397 S.E.2d 117 (1990); Thomas v. Greer, 573
N.E.2d 814 (111. 1991); State v. Neary, 470 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Iowa 1991); Brabander v. Western
Co-op Elect., 811 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Kan. 1991); Lincoln County Fiscal Ct. v. Department of
Public Advocacy, 794 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Ky. 1990); Standiford v. Standiford, 598 A.2d 495,
504 (Md. App. 1991); Massachusetts Community College Council MTA/NEA v. Labor
Relations Comm., 522 N.E.2d 416, 417 (Mass. 1988); Browder v. International Fidelity Ins.
Co., 321 N.W.2d 668, 673 (Mich. 1982); Commissioner of Revenue v. Richardson, 302
N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1981); Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo.
1988); Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd. 1980-1I, 710 P.2d 33, 35 (Mont. 1985); State v. Schuh,
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Resort to any outside aid is not proper.' One method employed by some
jurisdictions is to review statutes and laws passed contemporaneously with
the statute to assist in finding the plain meaning of the statute at issue.3
Others limit review, using Caminetti as a precedent, that unambiguous
language is the only answer, save the Golden Rule, for statutory interpretation.' Some courts reason that the Plain Meaning Rule is required so that
"determinations of the elected representatives will be effective without
judicial adjustment or gloss." 95 Courts feel that the "legislative will" is
expressed in the language of the statute so that speculation as to other
meanings of the statute is judicial activism.' Courts presume that legislatures know the meaning of the words chosen. 97 Or, as one court more
poetically stated, "[t]his court assumes that statutes mean what they say and
that legislators have said what they meant.""
Several states have general statutory construction guidelines enacted by
statute; which courts are required to utilize in construing a state statute.
Several states have statutes which indicate that any legislation must be

467 N.W.2d 409 (Neb. 1991); Roberts v. State, 752 P.2d 221, 223 (Nev. 1988); State v.
Johnson, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (N.H. 1991); Twiss v. State Dept. of Treasury, 591 A.2d 913, 918
(N.J. 1991); Landavazo v. Sanchez, 802 P.2d 1283, 1286 (N.M. 1990); Shover v. Cordis
Corp., 574 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio 1991); Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Okla. 1984);
Mercy Health Promotion v. Dept. of Revenue, 795 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Or. 1990); Frontini v.
Dept. of Transportation, 593 A.2d 410, 412 (Pa. 1991) (Larsen, J., concurring); Philadelphia
Housing Authority v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 499 A.2d 294, 297
(Pa. 1985); Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 586 A.2d 1055 (R.I. 1991); State
v. McKnight, 352 S.E.2d 471, 473 (S.C. 1987); In re Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347
N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D. 1984); National Gas Distr. Inc. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. 1991);
Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985); Schurtz v. BMW of N. Amer., Inc., 814
P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); In re Graziani, 591 A.2d 91, 94 (Vt. 1991); Brown v. Lukhard,
330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Va. 1985); In re Personal Restraint of Long, 815 P.2d 257, 262 (Wash.
1991) State ex rel. Roach v. Dietrick, 404 S.E.2d 415, 417 (W. Va. 1991); State v. Martin, 470
N.W.2d 900, 904 (Wise. 1991); DiVenere v. University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273 (Wyo.
1991).
92. Lincoln County Fiscal Ct. v. Dept. of Public Advocacy, 794 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Ky.
1990); Phelps v. Hillhaven Corp., 752 P.2d 737,741 (Mont. 1988), overruled on other grounds,
Anderson v. Hammer 1991 WL 182110; Brown v. Lukhard, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Va. 1985).
93. City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90, 96 (Colo. 1991); Collier v. Connolley,
400 A.2d 1107 (Md. 1979).
94. James J. Welch & Co. v. Deputy Comm'r of Capital Planning and Operations, 443
N.E.2d 382, 384 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Caininetti).
95. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo.
1991); see Hinchey v. Thomasson, 727 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ark. 1987); Simpson v. Office of
Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 400 (D.C. 1991); Ringewald v. Crawford W. Long Memorial
Hosp., 368 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Spivey v. Ehiddon, 397 S.E.2d
117 (1990); Loewenstein v. Amateur Softball Assoc. of Amer., 418 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Neb.
1988).
96. American Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Neary, 470 N.W.2d 27, 29 (Iowa 1991); Brabander v. Western
Coop Elect., 811 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Kan. 1991); In re Closing of Jamesburg High School, 416
A.2d 896 (N.J. 1980); Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Okla. 1984).
97. Hinchey v. Thomasson, 727 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ark. 1987); Baskerville-Donovan v.
Pensacola Executive House Cond. Assoc., 581 So.2d 1301 (Fla. 1991).
98. In re Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D. 1984).
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interpreted by a Plain Meaning method.'

Other states have statutes that

direct the courts to interpret words and phrases according to their plain

meaning, unless such are technical words and phrases. 1"

Although this

should require a plain meaning approach, the command does not always

result in courts employing the Plain Meaning Rule.101
There are several courts that are hybrid Plain Meaning Rule jurisdic-

tions. These courts give some respect to the Plain Meaning Rule. 1"
However, most of these courts will go beyond the plain meaning of the
statute, if reference to legislative history provides an "appropriate interpretation," 3 to effectuate the purpose of the law," 4 to interpret according to
the clearly expressed legislative intenl 5 or implement the legislative intent
to the fullest degree."
Another state rejects the literal meaning and

99. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 71 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) ("The following rules shall
be observed in the construction of statutes, unless such construction is inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the enactment. . ."); MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (West 1947) ("When the words of a law
in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the
law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit"); N.Y. STATUTES § 76
(McKinney 1971) ("Where words of a statute are free from ambiguity and express plainly,
clearly and distinctly the legislative intent, resort may not be had to other means of interpretation"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-05 (1987) "When the wording of a statute is clear and free
of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing, its spirit."
1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b) (1992) (When the word, of a statute are clear and free from all
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit).
It is noted that although states have rules for statutory interpretation, courts will interpret
statutes without reference to the rule. Therefore, some cases from state courts interpreting
statutes are included at other junctures, where the court's analysis is not based upon one of the
rules of construction, but the courts own determination of a method of statutory construction.
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-213 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1-4-1 (1976); LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 5053 (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.3a (1991); N.J.S.A. § 1:1-I
(1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1 (West 1987); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.002 (West
1988)(West 1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 42 (1991); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 990.001 (West
1985).
101. For example, see California, where there is a statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1858
(Deering 1992) ("In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the judge is simply
to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has
been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted. . ."), yet courts interpret statutes enacted by
the state legislature by examining history to find the purpose of the law. Cf People v. Pieters,
802 P.2d 420, 423 (Cal. 1991). See also Maine, which has a statute, supra note 99, yet the
courts also seek to ascertain the real purpose of the statute, which includes review of the
legislative history. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. v. Board of Environmental Protection, 595 A.2d
438, 442 (Me. 1991). The Maine court does note that the purpose should be obtained "if
possible" from the plain meaning of the statute, but the court is clearly not following the
statutory construction statute. Id. at 442.
102. Paradis v. Webber Hosp., 409 A.2d 672, 675 (Me. 1979).
103. Girard v. Wagenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Mich. 1991).
104. People v. Pieters, 802 P.2d 420, 423 (Cal. 1991); Bangor Hydro-Electric v. Board of
Environmental Protection, 595 A.2d 438, 442 (Me. 1991); Electric Supply Co. of Durham, Inc.
v. Swain Elec. Co., 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (N.C. 1991).
105. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 797 P.2d 1385 (Idaho 1990); Marion County
Sheriffs Merit Bd. Peoples Broadcasting Corp., 547 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind. 1989).
106. Reefshare, Ltd. v. Nagata, 762 P.2d 169, 174 (Hawaii 1988).
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demands that an interpretive reading be followed if the two are in conflict.
In contrast, the Plain Meaning Rule clearly requires the literal
meaning to be used and stops the analysis before looking for a sensible
meaning. A simple attempt at applying the Plain Meaning Rule is sufficient
to label a state a "Hybrid Plain Meaning Rule Jurisdiction."
There exists only one state that clearly rejects the Plain Meaning Rule,
that being Alaska.' In Alaska, the courts use a sliding scale for statutory
interpretation cases, whereby the clearer and unambiguous the statute, the
heavier the burden of demonstrating a legislative intent contrary to the literal
meaning." ° In reviewing legislative history, Alaskans are "mindful that the
plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must
be."110
THE RULE SHOULD LIVE

The Plain Meaning Rule is a rational method for a court to use or
employ in interpreting a statute. I understand that other methods of
interpreting a statute have a rational basis. My position is that one rule
should be adopted by both federal and state judicial systems, and the most
simple method would be adopting the Plain Meaning Rule. If the legislature
understands that a court will interpret all statutes employing the Plain
Meaning Rule, such legislative body would draft statutes accordingly.'
How should a legislature act? A few suggestions come to mind. One is
that the legislature should use clear, precise words where possible. Where
clarity and precision would be difficult, the legislature should include
definitions to provide plain meanings for words or phrases. Courts could
then interpret according to the purpose of the statute without the necessity for
a search of extra-textual material.
Further, there should be an "established background of legal principles
against which all enactments are adopted.""' These maxims of statutory
interpretation should clearly be few because legislators would not respect a

107. Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So.2d 1140, 1148 n.15 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 377
(1991).
108. University of Alaska v. Geistauts, 666 P.2d 424, 428 n.5 (Alaska 1983).
109. "Where a statute's meaning appears clear and unambiguous, . . . the party asserting
a different meaning bears a correspondingly heavy burden of demonstrating contrary legislative
intent." Id.
110. State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 209 n.4 (Alaska 1982) (quoting United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 414 U.S. 909 (1973)).
11I.As Justice Scalia stated, "[w]hat is of paramount importance is that Congress be able
to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the
language it adopts." Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989). Courts should act to
foster the democratic process by interpreting statutes according to the face of the law which was
enacted. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J.,concurring in part).
112. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley Jr., Co. 112 S. Ct. 2447,2458 (1992).
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long laundry list.113 Consequently, courts would pick and choose the
maxim, not to interpret the statute, but to use as a means for the decision's
conclusion."' Therefore, the legislature will make the law and the courts
will interpret and apply the law, not seek a "possible" interpretation of the
law.
I believe, however, that it would be proper in some instances for the
legislature to mandate a court to use legislative history. In other words, a
statute may include a provision that such statute would be interpreted, not by
the normal Plain Meaning Rule, but with use of legislative history to
ascertain the legislative purpose. It would be advisable for such a statute to
include, and thereby limit, the history which could be used by the court. The
statute should specifically indicate the legislative history to be used by the
courts in interpreting the statute. Such history, in my opinion, should be
limited to either committee reports or statements of the floor manager of the
bill. In such case, the limited legislative history could be used by the court
to interpret the statute, which due to its nature, could not be drafted clearly
employing normal language. 5 In such a situation, the court would be using
the Plain Meaning Rule, which requires it to follow the language of the
statute. Of course I believe that an emphatic reason would be needed for
including a Plain Meaning Rule disclaimer. For example, when Congress is
incapable of finding language that clearly sets forth the goals of the Act, one
must review the sentiment of the legislature in order to ascertain its intent
and understand its requirements. A Plain Meaning Rule disclaimer would
certainly be appropriate in such a situation.

113. The few I would suggest are:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Repeal by implication is disfavored.

Penal law are to be strictly construed.
Laws in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed.
Expression of one thing means the exclusion of another thing.
Remedial statutes are liberally construed.

Many of these maxims are used by the courts. However, in my opinion, courts use maxims as

sayings to strengthen their opinions and not as moving forces which form the basis of the
opinion's analytic development.

Under my proposal, the few maxims would be actually

employed both by the legislature in writing statutes and the judicial system in interpreting the
statutes.
114. Of course, a clear disclaimer in a specific enactment would overcome using a statutory

maxim.
115. Fundamentally, it is the legislature, not the judiciary, that enacts laws. Some may argue
that it is politically impossible at times for the legislature to enact certain statutes, but it could
enact vague statutes, with history that provides signals to the courts, so that the courts will
interpret it properly. Therefore, the legislature avoids political problems. As I tell my legal
methods students, it is the legislature's job to write the laws. Others may argue that statutes are

the results of compromise, so that in order to pass, the statute must be vague. However, again
I feel that the legislature is not doing its job, but delegating their function to the courts.

And,

as a political matter, the courts are not accountable if the public disfavors the law. My proposal
is more democratic, with a small "d", in that it requires the branch of government who function
is to write laws, to do so, accountable to their constituents for its actions.
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Statutes should codify a public policy clearly. I believe by starting with
the Plain Meaning Rule, all members of a democratic society could review
any legislative enactments and understand the laws application. With the
Plain Meaning Rule, there exists a better separation of powers. Without the
Plain Meaning Rule, we become a country of libraries, not of laws, because
the answer to problems is not found in the statute, but in some historical
document, whose availability to society may be limited. Or, to paraphrase the
"high priest," without the mooring of the language of a statute, society is left
"to drift on the currents of lawyerly invention."116

116. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 196 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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